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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LE·STEH RALPH ROMERO and
\1.\XINE HO~IERO, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
\'ICri,OR ~Clll\1 lDT and RAE
SCII ~IIDT, his wife; TOM B. WILCOX
and ~I H~. TO~I \YILCOX, his wife;
and MR. ART CASEY and MARIE
CAS.EY, his wife,

No. 99·22

Dl'fcndants andRespondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Action to foreclose real estate contract as note and
mortgage. Respondents allege .tender of paymen1Js prior
to notice of acceleration hy Appellants and estoppel as
a defense.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Those elements necessary to prove PJaintiffs' and
Appellants' case were admitted and the defens·es alleged
were tried by the court sitting as a court of equity with
an advisory jury. Judgment of no cause of aJCtion was
entered against Plaintiffs and .Appellants and fl"om that
judgment Appellants have appeal·ed.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPE~AL
Defendants and Respondents ·see:k judgment of thi~
court .affirming the judgment of the Distriet Court of
no cause of action in favor of Defendants-Respondents
and against Plaintiffs-Appellants.
STATEI\1ENT OF FACTrS
For purpos·es of convenience Plaintiffs and Appellants will hereinafter he referred to as Appellants.
Defendants and Respondents Victor Schmidt rand Rae
Schmidt, his wife, win hereinafte·r sometimes be referred
to as Schmidt or Schmidts; Defendants and R.espondents
Tom B. Wilcox and Mrs. Tom Wilcox, his wife, will
hereinafter sometimes be referred to as Wilcox or Wilcoxs and Defendants and Respondents Mr. Art Casey
and Marie Crusey, his wife, will hereinafter sometimes
be refer~ed to as Casey or Caseys.
Inasmuch as Appellants have failed to elucidate all
pertinent facts in connection with thi·s appeal, Respondents invite the court's attention to the evidence and
record in the following particulars.
Appellants as sellers and Respondents Schmidt as
buyers entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract
for the purchase and sale of 325 Oakley Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah (R-7 and 8). S.aid Uniform Real Estate
Contract is nO't dated but shows that the rbuyer is to
receive p<Yssession of the described prorperty on July 17,
1961. The eontra0t is in the standard form 'and that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pr·ovision under paragraph-! of the Uni~onn Real Est.wte
Contraet providing for the date from which interest is
to be charged is blank ( R-7 and 8).
rrhe Respondents Schmidt Inade each of the payIIH'Ilt:-; maturing on the contract promptly as they came
due to and including the payment of August, 1962 (R100). In September of 1962 the Respondents Schmidt
a~~igned their interest in said Uniform Real E'siate
Contract to the Respondents Wilcox who accepted the
same with the idea and ~or the purpose of reselling
the property (R-109). On or .about September 26, 19·62
\Yilcox entered into an Earnest 1\foney Receipt ·and Offer
to Purchase with Respondents Casey (Ex. 3-P). The
real estate broker through whom said Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase was procurred was Alder\Vallace Inc. (R-129, lines 13-19). Wilcox and his partner, James Richard Glavas (R-109, lines 24-28) contacted
Appellant Lester Romero andjor Romero's associate,
John "\V. Taylor several times concerning the unpaid
balance due on the Uniform Real Estate Oontract (R110-118; R 147-151; R 156-159). Romero was also contacted on two oooasions ·by H. Mervin Wallace, broker
for Alder- "\Yallace, Inc., the real estate agent handling
the transaction between Wilcox and Caseys (R 131-133).
During the cours·e of an early conversation between
Taylor, Glavas, Romero and Wilcox (R 158-159) a discrepancy in the contract balance w.as noted and Mr.
Romero stated to Mr. Taylor, "John, work it out with
them, see what you can do. See if you can get the probSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lems solved." (R.159, lines 14-15). Thereafter the parties
had various meetings in .an attempt to work the problem
out but were never able to harmonize their divergencies.
During ~the course of ~these negotiations Wilcox gave
Ro·mero his personal check for $89.00 (R 113, lines 18
to 20). Thi'S cheek was dishonored by the bank. The
check (Ex. 2-P) shows on the back thereof that it was
sent through the clearing houS'e twice, the firsi time on
October 9, 1962 and the second time on October 15, 1962
and that it was finally returned to the Appellant Romero
on the 18th day of October, 1962. Romero immediately
took the check ~to the office of his attorney (R. 161).
No fuDther notice was given by Romero to Respondents
or to Wallace that negotiations were ceased and that
strict performance was demanded (R 161-162) and on
October 24, 1962, Romero's caused a notice (R 9 and
10) to be served upon Respondents wherein Rom eros
elected under the provision of paragraph 16~( c) of the
Uniform Real ES'tate ·Contract (Ex. 1-P) to treat said
contraCJt as 1a note and mortgage ; to declare ~the entire
unpaid balance on 'Said conract to be immediately due
and payable, and to foreclose isaid mort~ruge and note.
Payment was not n1ade of the full balance demanded
and on January ·of 1963 Romero commenced :this ootion
for foreclosure.
The record will show that the Appellants could have
received all payments due on the contract (R 131-133)
and in point of fact all payments due on ~the contract
have been paid to Romero who has received and credited
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the same to his account since the decision of ·the trial
('ourt in conne<--tion with this 1natter. At no time have
Ute Ht>~pondents or either of .them attempted to :r-enig
on their obligation or to give Appellants anything less
than they were entitled to under the terms of the Uniform
Heal E~tate Contract. All ·efforts of Respondents have
been directed toward obtaining 'a correct contract balanee upon which Respondents Casey could rely in accepting the buyer's interest in said Uniform Real Estate
Contract .and agreeing to assume and pay the same.
Hespondents have •at all times been willing to pay Appellant~ all sUins due to them (R 33 Affirmative Defense
Xo. 5). Appellants are entirely whole in this transaetion and would not lose one cent as 1the result of the
judgment entered by the trial court. Respondents have
made no e:ffurt to avoid payment or to as'Sel'lt thaJt the
balance of the contract was more than Appellants were
l'ntitled to, 'but have been willing, rut all times, ~to fully
comply with the terms of the contract, upon receipt of
certain necessary coopel"ation from Romero which Romero failed to provide. These facts will be more fully
developed in the following argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
RESPONDENTS MADE A LEGALLY SUFFICIENT
TENDER OF DELINQUENT PAYMENTS TO APPELLANTS'
PRIOR TO APPELLANTS' NOTICE ACCELERATING THE
BALANCE DUE UNDER THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE
CONTRACT, THUS CUTTING OFF APPELLANTS' RIGHT
TO FORECLOSE SAID UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The law concerning tender of delinquencies prior
to notice accelerating the full unpaid balance is succinctly
stated in the following teX!t from 36 Am. J ur. :l\lortgages,
Section 400, pages 887-88:
Although there is authority to the contrary,
the preVIailing rule is to the effect that a tender
of arrears due on a mortgage containing an acceleration clause, made before the holder of the
mortgage has eX!ercis-ed his option to declare the
entire amount of the debt due, prevents the exercise of such option.
Was there, in this case, a le~ally sufficient tender
of delinquent payments, prior to notice by appellants,
accelerating the balance of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract1

H. Mervin Wallace, the broker for Alder-Wallace,
Inc., the company brokering the sale of rthe subject
proper1ty from Wilcox to Casey ( R 129, lines 6-19) stated
in his ~testimony that he had a convers-ation by telephone
with the appeHant, Les,ter Romero, on Friday, October
12, 19,62 (R 130, line 29) and again on Octoiber 15, 1962.
(R. 131 lines 24-28). In the telephone conversation of
Octo her 15, 1962, H. M·ervin Wallace stated :
A. !That if there was any delinquency the
contract would be brought to date; that our people
were taking it over a:s of October 1 ; ~and, if ~there
was any delinquency, it would be brought to date.
(R 113, lines 24-27).
At the time of this conversation vVaHace was holding
money in his rtrust account of a 'Sum sufficient to pay ·all
delinquencies on the contract (R 133, line 30 and 134,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lines 1-4). 'Yallace had authority to disburse these funds
in any manner necessary ·t:o clos·e the deal (R 143, lines
~7 -30 and R 136, lines 19-25).
In 3~ Aln. J ur. on Tender, Sechon 24, page 232,
we read:

That where the condition is one which the
debtor has the right to insist ·on, a tender made
subject to that condition is valid. (See also
Woods vs. Dbcon, 93 Ore. 681, 240 P2d. 520).

It is submitted that under •the facls of thi·s oose
there was a tender and that the condition attached to
the tender of payment ·of all delinquencies on the Uniform Real Estate Contract was one upon which the
respondents had a right to insist. Inasmuch as the
respondents Casey were agreeing to a;ssume and p:ay
a contract, it was necessary that they know the balance
thereof (R 129, lines 23-30, R 134, lines 11-15). Appellants 'have maintained throughout that this balance could
have been mathematically ascertained by the respondents,
independent of .any action hy appellants. The fallacy
of this argwnent lies in the fact that respondent Wilcox
made various attempts to obtain the correct balance as
did H. :Mervin Wallace (R 111-112, R 113, lines 18-27,
R 114, lines 6-29, R 117, lines 11-27 R 131, 132 and 133).
Xotwithstanding each of these attempts the halance ·oo.
the contract which Romero gave was incorrect. The
balance which Romero gave as of September, but would
not confirm, was $11,417.74 or $11,328.7 ±, depending on
the interpretation of the conversation between Wallace
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
and Romero on October 15, 1962, ( R 141, lines 26-30,
R 142, lines 1-8), where·as the actual and correct balance
on said contract of August 1, 1962, was $11,147.75 (R.
126, lines 15-17). Interest on the co·rrect balance to
September would he approximately $61.00, learving a discrepancy of $120.00 to $209.00. To expect ra buyer to
assume an obh~ation the exact extent of which could
no!t he verified by the creditor would make the transfer
of 'proper.ty in ~the modern commercial world impossible.
The buyer would he unwilling to assume a balance unless
he could verify if ~that was the amount due and that
verification must come from the creditor. This would
then m~ake it impossible for a seller ~to sell.
One further argument rs pertinent with reference
to the appellants' contention that respondents could have
made ~the simple mathematical calculation necessary to
determine the unpaid balance of the contract (Appellants' Brief, page 11). The Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 1-P), under paragraph 4 is silent on the
date from which interest is to be charged. The rate
of intere~st is sta1ted but t'he date at which it is to commence is not mentioned and the balance could, therefore,
he calculated only by the mutual cons·ent of Romero and
respondents, or their agent. Respondents were, there£ore, placed in a position where it was necessary to
obtain the information requested from Romero prior
to stating a balance on the contract Oaseys would be
required to assume and pay.
Appellant ·stated to the Court in his brief, page 5;
that there is no showing ~that the tender occurred prior
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to the date of notice accelerating the balance on the
<'On tract.

There is testimony of H. .l\lervin Wallace in
the record that his tender of payments to Romero wa:s
made on October 15, 1962 (R 133, lines 12-30, R 134,
lines 1-ti, R 136, lines 19-25). The Court had this testimony before it and concluded that:
The tender to Plaintiffs of all delinquent payments on the contract wa;s made prior ~to the
time notice was given by Plaintiffs in which they
s·tated their intentions to accelerate the balance
due under the U ni~orm Real E·state Contract betwePn Plaintiffs a;s Sellers and Defendant Schmidt
as Buyers. (R 83, Findings of F act No. 3).
1

It is an undisputed fact that the notice accelerating the
payments was dated October 24, 1962 ( R 9 and 10)
which was 9 days subsequent to the date of tender by
Mr. Wallace, agent for Wilcox and Case~.
Appellant also cites in his brief p:age 5 the disagreement between the testimony of Romero and W allace. Wallace testified that he had made a tender and·
Romero testified that he had not. This disparity in
testimony was resolved by the finder of the :facts in
favor of Wallace's testimony (R 83, Finding of Fact
Xo. 3). There is evidence in the record to support the
finding (R 133 lines 12-30; R 134 lines 1-6 ; ~ 136 lines
19-25) and this finding by the trial Oourt should not
be disturbed.
Appellant further argues that since the check of
Wilcox marked insufficient funds was not returned to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Romero until October 18, 1962, and that since the conversation between Romero ~and W alla0e took pJace on
October 15, 1962, Romero could not, at the time of his
conversation with \TV allace, have known that the contract was in default (Appellant's Brief, pages 5 and 6).
A cursory examination of the check (Exhibit 2-P) shows
on the back thereof that the check went through the
clearing house ~twice, once on October 9, 1962, and once
on October 15, 1962. The first of these date'S was 6
days prior to the conversation between Romero and Wallace and the second one on the date of the conversation
between Romero and Wallace. The date of October 18,
1962, was the date on which it was finally returned to
Les'ter Romero but since it h.ad been dishonored as early
as October 9, 1962, Ro,mero could have had notice of
the dishonor prior to his conversation on October 15,
1962, with W~aHace. This conclusion is further fortified
by the fact that the check went through the clearing
house twice. It could only be concluded that it was sent
through a second time at the instruction of the depositor
who would have h.ad notice of its dishonor on the first
deposit.
In addition, Romero told Wallace in their conversation of October 15, 1962, that the contract was in default
(R 133, lines 5-9, R 140, lines 26-30, R 141, line 1). Romero
could only have made this :statement to Wallace in truth
if he ~mew .at the time that the check had been dishonored,
inasmuch as the contract would nO't have been in default
had the check not been dishonored.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At thP eonclusion of the l"vidence, the Court sub-

mitted the ca8e to the advisory jury for a special verdict.
Interrogatory 3 in said special verdict asked: "Did the
~ehmidt~ or anyone acting in their behalf make a tender
of payment to the Romeros~" Answer, "Yes" (R 80).
This finding by the advisory jury, which finding
wa~ adopted by the Court, is sustainable by evidence in
the record and is a conclusive answer to appellant's contention that no tender was made. The te~stimony of W.allaeP (R 133 lines 24-27 and R 136, lines 19..:25) is clearly
sufficient to sustain such a finding hy the advisory jury
and by the Court. The findings of the ·advisory jury
and Court that a valid tender was made to appellants
prior to their notice ·accelerating the balance on the
contract, and the judgment of the Court entered 8JS a
corollary thereto, should be sustained.
It is further submitted to the 'Court in connection
with this argument th.at a tender beyond that which was
made to Romero would have been useless. Wallace testified that:

A. ". . . When I asked (Romero) if I could
use that figure, as a closing figure, he ~told me he
was going to foreclose on the place." (R 133, lines
5-9).
The attitude of Romero .as disclosed by the entire record
was that he failed to cooperate in ·arriving at the balance.
on the contract and that on October 15, 1962, he was
going to foreclose on the place. In 52 Am. J ur. on·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Tender, page 218, section 5, we read under the heading
"Necessity in Equity", the following:
As at law, an actual tender by the debtor is unnecessary when it is plain, from the aets or conduct of the other party or the circumstances or.
situations of a transaction or property, that a
tender would be nugatory, since equity does not
require a useless and idle £ormality.
The illustration of this point states :
A further illustration of the rule in equity, it
has been held that a tender of the amount due
on a contract for the sale of real estate is not
necessary, if the vendor states that it will be
useless.
I~t is submitted that 'had the money been displayed
to Romero on October 15, as Mr. Barker, in his Brief,
(pages 9 and 10) argues, there is ample evidence to
support a conclusion that Romero would have rejected
and repudiated such a tender (R 123, lines 5-9). In connection with this argument, see also 55 Am. J ur., Vendor'
and Purchaser, Section 601, pages 994-995 and Clark,
et al v. Paddock (Idaho) 132 Pac. 795.

POINT II.
APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED BY THEIR ACTS AND
OMISSIONS TO EXERCISE THE ACCELERATION CLAUSE
IN 'THE UNIFORM REAL EST~TE CONTRACT AND TO
FORECLOSE SAID CONTRACT AS A NOTE AND MORTGAGE.

In the Florida cruse of River Holding Compa;ny v.
Nickel, et ux, 62 So. 2d., 702, the Florida Court observed:
A court of equity is a forum f'Or the administration of justice.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In thP rPnmt California case of Bisno, et al v. Sax,
d ul, :1·Hi P~d. S 14, the Court observed that:
Equity does not wait upon precedent which

exaetly squares with the facts in controversy, but
will a~~ert itself in those situations where right
and justice would be defeated, but for its interVPntion.
~~ti,

l.n 36 Am. Jur. on Mortgages, Section 398, page.
the following statement is made:
The :\l.ortgagee may be estopped from exercising an option to accelerate the maturity of the
Inortgage by hi:s conduct, as where he has wrongfully prevented the payment .and thereby caused
the default creating the option.

It i~ the contention of respondents that the appelbmts .are e~topped from exercising the option to accelerate the contract by their conduct (R 41, Affirmative
Defense No. 3, R 51, pa:vagraph 2).

The Court submitted the following question to the
advisory jury :
5. Did the Romeros fail or refuse to reasonably participate in proceedings or measures that
would determine the ·exact amount then on the
contract?
A: Yes (R 80, Interrogatory No. 5).
1.,he Court adopted this finding in its Findings of Fact
(R 83, Finding No.2). There is evidence to support this··
finding in the testimony of Glavas. (R 113, lines 18~27,
R 114, R 117, lines 22 to 29) and in the testimony of
\\~allace (R 171, lines 7 to 13). The record is clear that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appellants or appellants' agent, John Taylor, never at
any time gave to respondents or r-espondents' agent the
correct balance on the contract. Romero, in his testimony, stated that the balance on the contract as of
September was $11,417.74 (R. 160, lines 15 to 18). The
corr:ect balance on the contract as of August was $11,147. 75 (R. 126, lines 15 to 18). This is a discrepancy
of $269.99, less accrued interest of approximately $61.00
to show the respective figures on parallel dates or a discrepancy of approximately $208.99. Respondents were
led to believe that Romero would cooperate with them
in adjusting this discrepancy in figures and in working
the problem out. Under examination by his cousel,
Romero testified as follows (R 159 lines 3-16) :

Q. What transpired

then~

A. They said : "We would like to talk to
you for ~a few minutes."

I said: "I am on my way to an appointment,
but I will be happy to sit down to see if we can
work it out."
They s.aid: "We need a balance."
I went and got John; I said, "John, do you
have the balance for these people~"

He said, "Yes". So, we sat down and started
talking about what the bal~ance w.as and it looked
like it was going into a long conversation. I had
to get off to my appointment.
I said, "John, work it out with them; see what
you can do. See if you can get the b.alance solved."

So I left at that time.
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The1·eafter, various meetings were held between
"John" (John \V. Taylor, an associate of Romero) (R
145 and 1-l()) at which the parties attempted to work.

oui the di~en'pancy and come to a correct balance. These
m'gotiations were terminated when Romeros, by and
through tiH'ir attorney, and without further notice to
\rilcox or ~ehmidt, and without giving them any opportunity to remedy the default, served notice terminating~
the lntyers' rights in the contract and exercising iheir
election to accelerate the ba:lance due (R 9-10). Respondent~ ~ubmit to the ~Court that to allow appellants to
have judgment against respondents, Wilcox and Schmidt
for a sum in excess of $11,500.00 together with attorney
fees, without first having given said respondents an
opportunity to remedy the default prior to notice of
acceleration is precisely that type of inequitable conduct
8poken of in the .Am. Jur. citation at section 398 of'
~[ortgages, which should estop the appellants from accelerating the maturity of the mortgage.
This principle is weU recognized by the Uta:h Supreme Court. In ~the case of Paoific Development Company v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P2d, 748, the Court
dealt with the question of whether a seller could be
l'~topped by his conduct toward the buyer, leading the
latter to believe that strict performance of his contract
would not be required and made the following pertinent
observation, at page 750:
There is no question that the acceptance by
the seller of buyers' past due payments and its
other conduct toward the buyers' leading the latter
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to believe that strict performance would not be
required by the seller, imposes upon the seller
the duty of giving the buyer a reasonable notice
before it may insist upon strict performance by
the buyer. (Emphasis added)
In Brown v. Chowchilla Land Compan.y, 59 Cal. App.
164, 210 Pac. 424, at page 427, the Court states:
The requirement of notice after the receipt
of overdue payments, without obj·ection, is based
upon the equitable consideration that by his conduct, the vendor has lead the vendee into the
belief that the former will continue to waive the
strict performance of the contract. (Emphasis
added)
While the Stewart case is not on all fours with the
facts of ~this case, it is abundantly clear that our Court
has recognized that the s·eller under a contract can, by
his conduct, impose upon himself the duty to give reasonable notice to the buyers before insisting upon strict
performance by the buyers. In the case now at bar, the
record discloses that the conduct of the appellant toward
the respondents, lead the latter to believe that they would
cooperate in obtaining a contract balance and working
out the problem incident to transfer of the property from
Wilcox to Oaseys. Then, without notice, all rights of
respondents in and to the property, by virtue of said
real estate contract, were terminated and appellants
now attempt to take .an unconscionable advantage of
respondent·s by a foreclosure, with its attendant costs
and attorney fees.
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Tht> trial eourt, after hearing the witnesses and
:-~Pt-ing their demeanor on the witness S'tand, was imprP:-\:-Il'd with thit-~ facd of the evidence and was doubtless
t•xprPssing in its findings, its statement to counsel. (See
H 17!i lines ts-:m, R 177, lines 1-6 and R 185, lines 1 ·to 24).
That the e.ontract states that time is of the essence,
there can be no doubt. That the contract also gives to
the appellants the right of foreclosure, there can probably t•qually be no doubt. However, as pointed out in
19 Am. J ur. on Estoppel at Section 40, page 639:
'rhe pffect of an estoppel in pais, is to prevent the assertion of what would otherwise be
an unequivocal right or to preclude what would
otherwise be a good defense.
Appellant has objected to the language in the Court's
li'indings of Fact, with reference to the question of fraud.
In 19 Am. J ur., Estoppel, Section 46, page 646, we
read the following:
"Estoppel in pais i·s sometimes said ·to be a
matter of morals, and it has been stated that
to permit the enforcement of estoppel of this
character such as will prevent a party from
asserting his legal rights to property, there must
generally be some·thing turpitude in his conduct.
In its last analysis the doctrine rests upon the
principle of fraud, and it has been ·said that in
cases where a party is concluded from asserting
his original rights in consequence of his acts or
conduct, in which ·the presence of fraud, .actual
or constructive, is wanting are generally referrable to principles, other than those of equitable
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sary to ·extend the terms "fraud" or "fraudulant", to situations which are more accurately
described as "unconscionable" or "Inequitable."
Neither actual fraud nor bad faith ·is generally
considered an essent·ial elemen.t." (Emphasis
added)
It is submitted that in the case now under consideration, fraud or fraudulant should come within the words
of the Am. J ur. text cited and be more accurately described as "unconsciona:ble" or ''inequitable." ·Ta:ken in
this light, the Findings of Fact are each sustainable.
The Court found:
That appellants misrepresented the unpaid
. balance due on the contract (R 83, paragraph 5).
This finding is supported by the testimony of Romero
that the balance of the contract as of September was
$11,417.74, whereas the correct balan0e as of August,
1963, was $11,147.75 and interest adjusting that figure
to September, 1963, would be approximately $61.00, leaving a discrepancy of approximately $209.00. (R 160,
lines 16-18 and R 126, line~s 15 to 18.
The trial court found:
That respondents were mislead by appellants'
conduct to belie·ve that Appellants would cooperate in arriving at a contract balance. (R 83, paragraph 5).
The testimony of Romero in which he indicated that
they would cooperate in arriving at a balance has been
set forth in detail in a prior portion of respondents'
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brit>f arHl need not be recited again at this point. Suffice
it to ~ay that ~neh eonduct on the part of Romero could

have led tlw trit>r of ,the fact to the conclusion that
rP~pondents and Romero would work towards solution
of the <·ontraet balance. The other Findings of Fact,
to-wit, Findings No. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 (R 83 and
~-!) a rP each sustainable by evidence in the record and
should be affirmed by 'this Court.
That inequitable conduct on the part of a creditor
will prohibit his accelerating the debt has been recognized
oy various courts. In Mu;rphy vs. Fox et. al, (Okla.) 278
I ~~d 820, there was a breach of the mortgage by the
defendant through defendant's failure to pay taxes on
the real ·estate before delinquency. Other allegations of
dt>fault were made. The Court in that case cited the
opinion of Chief Justice Cardoza in the leading case of
Uraff vs. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 171 N.E. 884,
70 A.L.R. 988 as follows:
There is no undeviating principal that equity
shall enforce the covenants of a mortgage, unmoved by an appeal ad misericordiam, however
urgent or affecting. The development of the judsdiction of the chancery is lined with historic
monuments that point another course. . . .One
could give many illustrations of the traditional
·and unchallenged exercise of a like dispensing
power. It runs through the whole rubric of accident and mistake. Equity follows the law but not
slavishly nor always. Hedges vs. Dixon County,
150 U.A. 182, 192, 1± S. Ct. 71, 37 L. Ed. 1014.
If it did, there could never be occasion for the
enforcement of equitable doctrine. 13 Halsbury,
Laws of England, page 68.
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To all this, acceleration clauses in mortgages
do not constitute an exception. They are not a
class by themselves removed from interference
by force of something peculiar in their internal
constitution. In general, it is true that they will
be enforced as they are written. In particular
this has been held by a covenant in a mortgage
accelerating the maturity of principal in default
of punctual payment of an installment of the
interest. . . . Less favor has been shown to a
provision for acceleration of a mortgage in default
of punctual payment of taxes or assessments. We
have held that such a provision, though not a
penalty in a strict or proper sense, is yet so closely
akin thereto in view of the forfeiture of credit
that equity will relieve ·against it if default has
been due to mere menial inattention and if relief
can be granted without damage to the lender.
(Emphasis added)
The case now under consideration is one where the
relief asked for by respondents can be granted and without damage to (the lender) appellant (emphasis added).
The Oklahoma Court in the Murphy case went on to
state (page 826) that:
This Court has adhered to the principal that
in a suit of equitable cognizence to foreclose a
real estate mortgage the trial court may refuse
foreclosure where there has been a technical default due to a mistruke or mere menial inattention,
and at no damage to the mortgages security or
prejudice to the mortgagees.
The California Court in the case of Bisno et. al. vs.
Sax et. al. 346 P2d 814, stated at page 821:
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That a court of Pq uity will relieve the debtor
from the enforcement of an acceleration clause
whPn confronted with generall yequitable grounds
therefore seems to be settled at law.... This is
true where the Co1trt considers an acceleration of
mafurit !J as a penalty or not. (Emphasis added)
'rhe California Court then quotes the case of Bard
Uahinfried Re:alty Company, 126 Misc. 427 213 N.Y.S.
+1, 45, as follows :
v~.

Whatever the holding 1nay be on this matter
of definition, the courts have shown a tendency
to get away from the general rule, and in a number of cases have relieved mortgages from their
defaults on the basis of doing equity. (Ibid, page
822)

California Court further quotes the N·ew York case of
Casper vs. Anderson Apartments, 196 Misc., 555 94
X.Y.S. :2nd 5·21, 525 as follows:
There is no undeviating rule that equity must
enforce the covenants of a mortgage regardless of surrounding circumstances. The whole
system of equity jurisprudence presents an excellent example of the triumph of equitable principals over strict and inapplicable documents of
common law....
The Utah Court has also recognized this rule in the
case of Home Ou.:ners' Loan Corporation vs. Washington,
161 P2d 355.
Appellant makes a point of the fact that the fraud
as shown in the Findings of Fact is not pleaded or set
forth in partcularity nor is it set out in the pre-tria]
order (Appellant's brief pages 13-17). In addition to
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what has heretofore been said in this brief with reference to fraud in equitable actions being in the nature
of unconscionable or inequitable conduct the respondents
have the following rebuttal to appellants' argument.
Appellant state's that:
Respondents waive their right to raise additional defenses by not asserting those defenses
in their answer as required by Rule 12 (h) of
Uta;h Rules of Civil Procedure. (Appellants' brief,
page 13.)
The last sentence of Rule 12(h) reads as follows:
The objection or defense, if made at the trial,
shall be disposed of as provided in rule 15 (h)
in the light of any evidence that may have been
received. (Rule 12(h) U.R.C.P.)
Rule 15 (b) titled Amendments to Conform to the
E.vidence, states :
When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion o.f
any party at any time after judgment; but failure
so to amend does not effect the ~esult o'f the result
of the trial of these issues." (Rule 15(b),U.R.C.P.)
(Emphasis added)
It is submitted that the Findings of Fact conform
to the evidence submitted at the trial and that the issues
at the trial were tried hy the ·express or complied consent of the appellants who raised no objection to the
evidence submitted to the Court with reference to the
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i;-;:mes of fraud or Inisrepresentation, using in this context the word fraud in its broadest context to include
unconscionable or inequitable conduct. (Se-e 19 Am. Jur.
on I~:~toppt-1, Section 46, page 646).
The findings of the Court with reference to the
im'quitable or unconcionable conduct giving rise to estoppel (R 83 and 8-l:) are within the ambit of the Court's
prP-trial order (R 51, paragraph 2).
The evidence sustains the findings of the trial
court with reference to inequitable and unconscionable.
conduct on the part of appellants and equity has clearly
prescribed principles which would relieve respondent's
from the harsh consequences of allowing ·appellants to
prt>\·ail in this action and accordingly the judgment of
the trial court should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The respondents have, at aU times, been ready,
willing and able to perform under the terms of th&
Uniform Real E'State Contract. The appeHants, by extending the simple cooperation that common courtesy
would dictate of most, could have made this entire action
with its attended costs and expens·es unnecessary. Sustaining by this Court of the trial court''S decision will
work no hardship on appellants but will place them in.
the position of receiving every cent which they are
entitled to under the Uniform Real Estat'e Contract leaving them w·hole. But for Appellants' conduct all payments would have been made before acceleration.
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Accordingly, respondents respectfully subn1it that
the judgment of the trial court was correct and should
be affirmed.
Respeetfully submitted,
L. Brent Hoggan
Kiston & Bettilyon
Attorneys for Respondents
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